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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Heber Light & Power Company's 
("HLP") Petition for Review of the Report and Order ("Order") issued by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") because the Order is not a "final agency 
action." See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-401, 63G-4-403, and 78A-3-102(3)(e)(i). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1; Does the Court have jurisdiction to consider HLP's Petition for Review 
where the Order HLP seeks to have reviewed is not a "final agency action" as required by 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-401, 63G-4-403, and 78A-3-102(3)(e)(i). This issue is not 
subject to a standard of review because it was not an issue before the Commission, but 
was presented in Rocky Mountain Power's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 
filed in this Court. 
Issue 2: Did the Commission err in concluding that it has jurisdiction over the 
complaint filed by Rocky Mountain Power on the ground that HLP may be a public 
utility to the extent it acts beyond its governmental authority by providing continuous and 
long-term electric service (not from surplus power) to customers outside of the 
boundaries of its member municipalities. This Court applies a correction-of-error 
standard when reviewing an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction or authority. 
Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 2001 UT 112, ^ j 18, 38 
P.3d 291. HLP preserved this issue for review in its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction and its Application for Agency Review. (Record ("R") 19, 
20, 38).1 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Statutes that are or may be determinative or of central importance to this appeal 
are as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(5), (7), (16)(a) and (b) 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102 
Complete copies of these statutes are provided in Addendum 1 to this brief. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Proceedings Below 
This matter was commenced on April 17, 2007, when Rocky Mountain Power 
filed a complaint with the Commission against HLP. (R. 1). Following a stay during 
which the parties attempted unsuccessfully to informally resolve their dispute, Rocky 
Mountain Power filed an amended complaint on February 5, 2008. (R. 9). On April 4, 
2008, HLP filed an answer and a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of 
1
 References to the Record are to the Record Index provided by the Commission. 
If the reference is to a specific page or pages in the document in the Record Index, the 
document number will be followed by a colon followed by the specific page number(s) in 
1he document cited. 
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jurisdiction. (R. 18-20). On November 3, 2008, following a further stay for the parties to 
attempt to negotiate a resolution, the Commission issued the Order denying HLP's 
motion to dismiss on November 3, 2008. (R. 34). In so doing, the Commission 
concluded that, u[t]o the extent [HLP] serves those extraterritorial customers, and to the 
extent it is acting just like any other public utility . . . [HLP] would be subject to 
commission jurisdiction as would any other public utility." (R. 34:20). On the same day 
the Commission issued the Order, it issued a Scheduling Order, setting further 
proceedings to resolve the issues raised by the amended complaint and answer. (R. 35). 
On December 3, 2008, HLP filed an Application for Agency Review of the Order. 
(R. 38). The Commission took no action with respect to HLP's application, so it was 
deemed denied on December 23, 2008. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(c). 
B, Proceedings Before This Court 
On January 21, 2009, HLP filed a Petition for Review of the Order in this Court. 
Rocky Mountain Power filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, arguing that 
the Court does not have jurisdiction because the Order is not a "final agency action" as 
required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-401(l) and (3)(a) and 78A-3-102(3)(e)(i). On 
March 2, 2009, the Court issued an order deferring consideration of Rocky Mountain 
Power's Motion to Dismiss until plenary presentation on the merits of HLP's Petition for 
Review. 
On May 5, 2009, HLP filed its Brief of Petitioner ("HLP's Brief) and also filed a 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief. On May 12, 2009, the Court informed the parties that it 
had given HLP's Petition for Extraordinary Relief a different case number, 
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No. 20090385-SC. On May 18, 2009, Rocky Mountain Power filed its Response in 
Opposition to Heber Light & Power Company's Petition for Extraordinary Relief in Case 
No. 20090385-SC.2 On May 26, 2009, the Court consolidated Case No. 20090385-SC 
with this case for purposes of argument. 
C. Statement Of Facts 
This matter is before the Court on a petition for review of a preliminary order 
denying a motion to dismiss. Given the early stage of the Commission proceeding when 
HLP filed its Petition for Review, no evidence had been presented to the Commission, 
and the Commission had made no findings of fact.3 Nonetheless, the parties have 
generally accepted certain background facts in their pleadings and for purposes of HLP's 
motion, but have disputes about the significance and implication of those facts. To 
provide context for the Court, Rocky Mountain Power provides the following statement 
of facts, noting where it disagrees with "facts" stated in HLP's Brief. 
HLP is an energy services interlocal entity formed by Heber City, Midway City 
and the Town of Charleston under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§11-
13-103, et seq. (R. 34:4). HLP provides retail electrical services to customers located 
within its members' municipal boundaries ("Municipal Boundaries") and also to a 
2
 Rocky Mountain Power also filed a Motion to Expedite Review that was denied 
in part and granted in part by an order of the Court issued April 28, 2009. 
3
 Since HLP filed its Petition for Review, both parties have filed various motions 
before the Commission and this Court, some of which have been supported by affidavits. 
Pursuant to the motions filed before the Commission, it has vacated its schedule and has 
not taken further action. The Commission did not, however, base this decision on any 
finding of fact. 
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substantial and growing number of customers located outside of the Municipal 
Boundaries. (Id.). 
Rocky Mountain Power is an electrical corporation holding a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing it to provide electric 
service to customers in many parts of the state of Utah, including Wasatch County. 
(R. 34:5). In furtherance of its obligation to serve customers in Wasatch County, Rocky 
Mountain Power has sought and obtained franchises from Wasatch County authorizing it 
to install, maintain, and operate facilities necessary to provide electric service in public 
rights of way in Wasatch County.4 (Id.). The customers served by HLP outside the 
Municipal Boundaries are in the service territory that the Commission has authorized and 
obligated Rocky Mountain Power to serve. (R. 34:4). HLP is aggressively competing 
with Rocky Mountain Power for service to new land developments in Rocky Mountain 
Power's service territory. (R. 9:4). 
HLP makes the unfounded claim that it has provided service outside the Municipal 
^Boundaries "because no other electric utility had the interest or facilities to provide 
service to customers scattered across the Heber Valley." (HLP's Brief at 7). In fact, as 
HLP is well aware, Rocky Mountain Power has been providing service for many years to 
customers in the Heber Valley. Rocky Mountain Power has always been willing to serve 
customers outside the Municipal Boundaries in the Heber Valley in accordance with its 
4
 Rocky Mountain Power is a division of PacifiCorp, the successor in interest to 
Utah Power & Light Company. Rocky Mountain Power is used in this brief to refer to 
both PacifiCorp and Utah Power & Light Company. 
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tariff. (R. 9:3; 30:4). However, given HLP's practices, Rocky Mountain Power has rarely 
been approached to provide service except in areas that HLP did not wish to serve. 
(R. 30:4). Until approximately 2000, there was essentially no competition between 
Rocky Mountain Power and HLP for service to customers outside the Municipal 
Boundaries, and Rocky Mountain Power believed the customers received service from 
the entity of their choice. Starting in approximately 2000, HLP started competing with 
Rocky Mountain Power for customers that had requested service from Rocky Mountain 
Power. More recently, Rocky Mountain Power installed substantial additional facilities 
in Wasatch County in part to provide service to proposed major new developments that 
had requested service from Rocky Mountain Power in the northeast portion of the Heber 
Valley. (R. 9:4). HLP responded by informing customers that they were required to take 
service from it and by requesting the Wasatch County Council to revoke Rocky Mountain 
Power's franchise in areas HLP wished to serve. (R. 9:4, 6). 
In light of these facts, Rocky Mountain Power filed a complaint against HLP 
alleging (as amended) that "[t]he electrical service provided by HL[]P is not the 
temporary wholesale of surplus product or capacity, but is rather part of a pattern of 
providing permanent, continuous, and expanding retail service in the normal course of 
business to customers outside the Municipal Boundaries" and is a "violation of Rocky 
Mountain Power's Certificate and Utah law."5 (R. 9:2). Rocky Mountain Power 
5
 Rocky Mountain Power also filed a complaint in district court seeking to prevent 
the Wasatch County Council from revoking its franchise. See Rocky Mountain Power v. 
Wasatch County, Civil No. 070500152 (Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Wasatch 
(continued . . .) 
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requested that the Commission determine, among other things, whether HLP has "surplus 
product or service capacity," whether this surplus capacity may be sold on a permanent 
basis to retail customers outside the Municipal Boundaries, and the nature and extent of 
Rocky Mountain Power's obligation to serve in Wasatch County. (R. 9:8-9). 
HLP filed an answer wherein it admitted, among other things, that it "does not 
provide temporary wholesale service to the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County and 
that as part of its normal course of business it provides services to customers in the 
unincorporated areas of Wasatch County." (R. 18:2). HLP further admitted that it 
"intends to continue to serve customers within its historic service territory [including 
outside the Municipal Boundaries]." (R. 18:3). In connection with its motion to dismiss, 
HLP admitted that it has provided service to customers outside the Municipal Boundaries 
for nearly one hundred years and that during that period it had gone "about the business 
of purchasing resources and constructing significant infrastructure in order to provide 
service" to those customers. (R. 20:3). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The Order Is Not A Final Agency Action. Therefore, This Court Does Not 
Have Jurisdiction To Review It. 
This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider HLP's Petition for Review of the 
Commission's Order because the Order is not a "final agency action." It is well-
established that this Court only has jurisdiction to review a "final agency action." See 
(. . . continued) 
County, Utah). This complaint was dismissed after the Wasatch County Council agreed 
that it would not revoke Rocky Mountain Power's franchise. 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(e)(i), 78A-3-102(6), and 63G-4-401; Barker v. Utah 
Public Service Comm % 970 P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998). In Union Pacific Railroad Co. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT 40, ]f 16, 999 P.2d 17, this Court created a three-
prong test to determine whether an agency action is final for purposes of judicial review. 
The prongs are (1) judicial review will not disrupt orderly adjudication by the agency, 
(2) rights and responsibilities have been determined and legal consequences flow from 
the agency decision, and (3) the agency decision is not preliminary with respect to 
subsequent agency action. Each prong must be met for the agency decision to qualify as 
a "final agency action." See id. 
Here HLP is asking the Court to review an order that does not meet any of the 
prongs. Judicial review of the Commission's Order at this stage of the proceedings 
would disrupt the orderly process of adjudication before the Commission because the 
Order did not conclude the proceedings before the Commission, did not determine the 
rights or obligations of the parties, and no legal consequences flow from it. Contrary to 
HLP's argument, the Commission did not conclude that it has jurisdiction over HLP. 
Rather, the Conumission determined that it has jurisdiction over entities that act "just like 
any other public utility" and that Commission proceedings should continue to determine 
whether HLP is one of those entities. (R. 34:20). Finally, the Order, which denied 
HLP's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, is clearly a preliminary decision. See 
Barney v. Division of Occupational & Prof Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah App. 
1992). 
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Because the Order does not meet any, let alone all, of the Union Pacific factors, 
the Order is not a "final agency action," and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review HLP's 
Petition for Review. Accordingly, Rocky Mountain Power's Motion to Dismiss should 
be granted.6 
B. The Commission Correctly Determined That It Has Jurisdiction Over HLP 
To The Extent HLP Exceeds Its Statutory Authority By Providing Service 
Outside The Municipal Boundaries Not From Temporary Surplus, 
Even if the Court determines that it has jurisdiction to consider HLP's Petition for 
Review, the Commission's Order should be affirmed. An interlocal entity such as HLP is 
only authorized to sell and deliver "product or service capacity" outside of its municipal 
boundaries if that "product or service capacity" is "surplus." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-
14(l)(d). Despite this limitation, HLP is providing continuous and long-term electric 
service (not from surplus power) to customers outside of its Municipal Boundaries. 
Adopting a hyper-technical reading of Utah's utility statutes, HLP argues that the 
Commission erred in determining that it had jurisdiction over Rocky Mountain Power's 
complaint. However, a reading of the relevant statutes and consideration of the 
Legislature's intent reveals that the Commission's determination is correct. Consistent 
with the rules of statutory interpretation, the Commission's analysis fully interrelates the 
6
 HLP also filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief wherein it argued that, even if 
the Order is not a "final agency action," this Court should nevertheless retain jurisdiction 
and issue an extraordinary writ reversing the Commission's Order. As explained in detail 
in Rocky Mountain Power's Response in Opposition to Heber Light & Power Company's 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief in Case No. 200903 85-SC, HLP cannot satisfy the 
prerequisites for obtaining extraordinary relief. Therefore, for the reasons contained in 
Rocky Mountain Power's response, HLP's request for extraordinary relief should be 
denied. 
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relevant statutes, reads them harmoniously, and concludes, with the assistance of pointed 
language from the courts and earlier Commission decisions, that the Legislature did not 
intend to allow municipalities or interlocal entities unfettered power to provide 
completely unregulated services wherever and to whomever they choose. Had the 
Commission reached any other conclusion, it would have violated another rule of 
statutory construction—that a statute not be read to produce an absurd result and thus 
defeat the Legislature's intent. See State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988). 
VL ARGUMENT 
A. HLP's Petition For Review Should Be Dismissed Because The Order Is Not A 
Final Agency Action And, Therefore, The Court Lacks Jurisdiction To 
Review It.7 
The Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of HLP's Petition for 
Review because the Order that HLP seeks to have reviewed is not a "final agency 
action." This Court has jurisdiction to review "final orders and decrees in formal 
adjudicative proceedings originating with . . . the Public Service Commission . . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(i). Section 78A-3-102(6) provides that "[t]he Supreme 
Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-4-401(l) states, in relevant part, that "[a] party aggrieved may obtain judicial 
Rocky Mountain Power has previously presented argument on this point in its 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed on 
February 2, 2009 and its Reply to HLP's Response to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction filed on February 26, 2009. Rocky Mountain Power is repeating these 
arguments in this brief for the convenience of the Court. There is no need for the Court 
to refer to these other documents. 
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review of final agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly 
prohibited by statute." (Emphasis added). Section 63G-4-401(3)(a) further provides that 
"[a] party shall file a petition for judicial review offinal agency action within 30 days 
after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued . . . . " (Emphasis 
added). As these statutory provisions make clear, the Court only has jurisdiction to 
review "final agency actions." See Barker, 970 P. 2d at 705. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act does not specifically define "final agency 
action." Nevertheless, the Court in Union Pacific, 2000 UT 40 at ]f 16, formulated a 
three-prong test to determine whether an agency action is final for purposes of judicial 
review: 
(1) Has administrative decision-making reached a stage 
where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of 
adjudication?; 
(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal 
consequences flow from the agency action?; and 
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary, 
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to 
subsequent agency action? 
Agency decisions that meet all of the foregoing prongs qualify as final agency 
actions and are, therefore, appealable. On the other hand, agency decisions that fail to 
satisfy any of the prongs, are not final agency actions and, therefore, are not appealable 
until the agency concludes its proceedings. See id. When the Order is examined under 
the Union Pacific three-prong test, it is clear that it fails to satisfy any of the prongs. 
- 1 1 -
Therefore, the Order is not a final agency action and this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review it. 
1. Judicial Review Will Disrupt the Orderly Process of Adjudication, 
The first prong of the Union Pacific test is whether the administrative decision-
making has reached a point where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of 
adjudication. See id. As will be discussed further below, the Order did not conclude the 
proceeding or determine the rights of the parties. Rather, it simply denied HLP's motion 
to dismiss. In fact, the same day the Commission issued the Order, it scheduled further 
proceedings to promptly address and resolve the issues raised in Rocky Mountain 
Power's amended complaint and HLP's answer. (R. 35). Therefore, it is apparent that 
judicial review of the Order will disrupt the orderly process of adjudication of the issues 
before the Commission. 
HLP relies on Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 491, 128 P.3d 
31, to support its claim that judicial review will not disrupt the Commission's orderly 
process of adjudication. (HLP's Brief at 32-33). Ameritemps, however, is readily 
distinguishable. In that case, the Court discussed the first prong of the Union Pacific 
analysis in the context of a worker's compensation case. The order at issue was the 
Labor Commission Appeals Board's final decision affirming an administrative law 
judge's decision awarding an employee permanent total disability compensation. In 
finding that the Order satisfied the first prong, the Court explained that "[although issues 
remained unresolved concerning the possibility of reemployment, the question of whether 
[the employee] was permanently totally disabled was disposed of completely by the 
- 1 2 -
Board. Thus, judicial review would not interfere with the Board's proceedings, since the 
Board had already refused to reconsider its prior order." Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491 
at \ 14 (internal quotations and punctuation omitted; emphasis added). In other words, 
where the Board had made a final conclusion that the employee was permanently totally 
disabled and, therefore, entitled to immediate commencement of disability compensation, 
the decision was a final agency action even though there could be further proceedings in 
the future regarding the possibility of rehabilitation. 
In the present case, the Commission has not changed the status quo in any way. It 
has not concluded that HLP must cease providing service outside the Municipal 
Boundaries, it has not determined whether HLP has surplus power, it has not determined 
whether HLP may sell surplus power on an expanding and permanent basis to retail 
customers outside the Municipal Boundaries, it has not determined whether Rocky 
Mountain Power has abandoned or forfeited its certificate or franchise, and it has not 
determined Rocky Mountain Power's obligation to provide service in Wasatch County in 
light of HLP's claims and actions. The Commission has done nothing more than reach 
the preliminarily conclusion that it has jurisdiction to consider some, or all, of the 
foregoing issues. 
Permitting HLP to appeal the Commission's Order at this stage of the proceeding 
would inevitably lead to piecemeal reviews, fragmented appeals, and disruption of the 
orderly process of adjudication. On this point, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit has explained that "it is more desirable to let the administrative process go 
forward without interruption than to permit the parties to petition the courts at various 
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intermediate stages. In that way, the agency can develop the necessary factual 
background, apply any special expertise it might posses, and correct its own errors." 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 669 F.2d 903, 907 (3rd Cir. 
1982). The court further explained that "[t]his judicial forbearance demonstrates a proper 
respect for administrative autonomy and allows the agency to function more efficiently 
and responsibly."' Id. 
The reasoning of the Third Circuit applies equally in this case. The Commission 
should be allowed to proceed to resolve the issues presented by Rocky Mountain Power's 
amended complaint and HLP's answer to develop the necessary factual background, 
apply its special expertise to the issues presented and to correct any error it may have 
made. Dismissing HLP's Petition for Review would demonstrate a proper respect for the 
role of the Commission and allow it to function efficiently and responsibly. 
2, No Rights or Obligations Were Determined by the Order, Nor Do 
Legal Consequences Flow from It. 
The second prong of the Union Pacific test is whether the Order has determined 
legal rights or obligations and whether legal consequences will flow from the Order. 
Union Pacific, 2000 UT 40 at f 16. The Commission's Order rejecting HLP's motion to 
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds did not determine the rights or obligations of Rocky 
Mountain Power or HLP. Nor do any legal consequences flow from the Order. On the 
contrary, the Commission has not determined the rights or obligations of the parties and 
has required no change in their current dealings. 
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HLP claims the Commission's Order "alters the legal regime under which HLP 
operates" and "could significantly affect and disrupt HLP's day-to-day operations." 
(HLP's Brief at 33-34). HLP also claims the Order "asserts general jurisdiction over 
HLP . . . to supervise and regulate HLP's business . . .." {Id, at 34). These arguments 
reveal HLP's fundamental misunderstanding of the Order. The Order does not "assert[] 
general jurisdiction over HLP," nor does it alter "the legal regime" or "disrupt HLP's 
day-to-day operations." A careful reading of the Order demonstrates that the 
Commission has not yet determined if, and to what extent, it has jurisdiction to regulate 
HLP. The Order denied HLP's motion to dismiss for lack jurisdiction explaining that, 
"[t]o the extent [HLP] serves those extra-territorial customers, and to the extent it is 
acting just like any other public utility . . . [HLP] would be subject to commission 
jurisdiction as would any other public utility." (R. 34:20). In other words, the Order has 
done nothing but set the stage for adjudication of whether the Commission has 
jurisdiction over HLP. The Commission's Order is simply an articulation of the 
Commission's own jurisdiction, and is nothing more than a decision that further 
proceedings are necessary to evaluate whether, given HLP's conduct, HLP is subject to 
that jurisdiction. 
More importantly, the Commission's Order does not impose any affirmative 
obligations on HLP. Indeed, because the Order does not determine whether the 
Commission ultimately has jurisdiction over HLP, the Order does not, nor could it, 
impose restrictions on HLP that have any legal force or practical effect. All that the 
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Order requires of HLP is that HLP present its case as to why it believes it is not acting 
like a public utility and, therefore, subject to Commission jurisdiction. 
In an effort to claim that the Order has legal consequences and will affect its 
rights, HLP cites Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997). (HLP's Brief at 35-37). 
Bennett, however, does little to support HLP's argument. In Bennett, the question 
decided was whether irrigation districts and ranchers had standing to challenge a 
Biological Opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species 
Act. Id. at 157. A subsidiary issue was whether the Biological Opinion was final agency 
action under the federal Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 161. The Biological 
Opinion stated how long-term operation of an irrigation project was likely to jeopardize 
certain endangered species and identified maintenance of minimum water levels on 
reservoirs as a prudent alternative. Id. at 158. The Opinion, which the Bureau of 
Reclamation said it would comply with, was the only action the Fish and Wildlife Service 
contemplated taking and, unlike the current case, was nothing like a preliminary decision 
denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
A case essentially identical in principle with the facts at issue here is CEC Energy 
Co., Inc. v. Public Service Comm 'n of the Virgin Islands, 891 F.2d 1107 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
In that case, the Public Service Commission ("PSC") issued an order stating its finding 
that it had jurisdiction to investigate a contract between CEC and another entity. CEC 
appealed to the Third Circuit which declined to opine on the PSC's authority because the 
PSC's order was not a "final agency action" and, therefore, not reviewable at that time. 
M a t 1108, 1112. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that "the [PSC] has taken a 
position, but only on the legal question of its own jurisdiction[,]" and "[i]ts decision 
constitutes no more than a determination that an investigation will commence, a 
prerequisite to definitive agency action." Id. at 1110. The court noted that "judicial 
interference in the investigatory process at this time [would] serve[] to disrupt and 
postpone a final agency determination that in the end could obviate the need for judicial 
review." Id. at 1112. The court further noted that "the only affirmative obligation 
imposed on CEC by PSC's jurisdictional determination is the obligation to respond to the 
Commission's further inquires." Id. at 1111. And while "future decisions of PSC may 
impose additional obligations on CEC . . . [a]t this time, however, that outcome is neither 
certain nor impending." Id. at 1112. Accordingly, the action was dismissed and the case 
proceeded before the agency. 
Like in CEC Energy, the Commission's Order here is a determination "only on the 
legal question of its own jurisdiction." Id. at 1110. Indeed, the Order constitutes nothing 
more than a decision that the Commission proceedings will continue in order to 
determine the extent of the Commission's jurisdiction, if any, over HLP. Id. at 1110. 
Nothing in the Order supports HLP's argument that its day-to-day business operations are 
affected or that the Commission now has general jurisdiction over it. Inasmuch as the 
Order is simply a preliminary jurisdictional determination and does not impose any 
affirmative obligations or have any practical legal effect on HLP, it fails the second prong 
of the Union Pacific test. 
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3. The Commission's Order Is a Preliminary Decision. 
The Order also fails the third prong of the Union Pacific test, which asks whether 
the Order is not, in whole or in part, preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or 
intermediate. Union Pacific, 2000 UT 40 at f^ 16. The Order, which denied HLP's 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is clearly a preliminary, preparatory, procedural, 
or intermediate decision. 
Utah case law is clear on this point—orders "denying motions to dismiss involve 
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate decisions" and therefore do not 
constitute a final agency action. Id. at J^ 21 (internal quotations omitted). In making that 
determination, the Court in Union Pacific cited with approval Barney v. Division of 
Occupational & Prof Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah App. 1992), a Court of Appeals 
opinion dealing with a procedural posture identical to that in the instant case. Id. 
In Barney, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing filed a petition 
against Mr. Barney. Among other things, Mr. Barney responded with a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that the Division did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. An administrative law judge denied the motion to 
dismiss, and Mr. Barney filed a petition for judicial review. The Court of Appeals 
dismissed the petition, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to review the denial of 
the petitioner's motion to dismiss because that decision was not a final agency action. 
Barney, 828 P.2d at 544. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained, in no uncertain 
terms, that "[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss allows the proceeding to continue in the 
agency and is not a final order for purposes of judicial review." Id. 
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The same is true here. HLP is seeking review of the Order denying its motion to 
dismiss. But, as noted by the Court of Appeals in Barney, and confirmed by this Court in 
Union Pacific, agency orders denying a party's motion to dismiss involve preliminary, 
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate decisions, and as a result, are not final agency 
actions. The Commission's Order in this case is a preliminary order. As already 
discussed, the Commission has not determined the substantive rights of the parties and 
will now proceed to address the issues raised by the amended complaint and HLP's 
answer. The Order fails to satisfy the third prong of the Union Pacific test. 
In sum, the Order fails to satisfy any of the Union Pacific factors, let alone all of 
them, as is required for the Order to qualify as a final agency action. Accordingly, HLP's 
Petition for Review should be dismissed on the ground that this Court does not have 
jurisdiction because the Commission's Order denying HLP's motion to dismiss was not a 
final agency action. 
4. HLP's Petition for Extraordinary Relief Should Be Denied. 
In addition to filing its opening brief on its Petition for Review, HLP filed a 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief. HLP's arguments in support of its Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief were included in its opening brief. (HLP's Brief at 38-43). After 
HLP filed its Petition for Extraordinary Relief in this case, the Court informed the parties 
that HLP's Petition for Extraordinary relief would be given a separate case number, 
No. 200903 85-SC. The cases have now been consolidated for purposes of argument. 
On May 18, 2009, Rocky Mountain Power filed its Response in Opposition to 
Heber Light & Power Company's Petition for Extraordinary Relief in Case 
- 1 9 -
No. 20090385-SC. Rocky Mountain Power's arguments as to why HLP's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief should be denied are set forth therein. For the sake of brevity, 
Rocky Mountain Power will not repeat those arguments here. Instead, Rocky Mountain 
Power respectfully requests that the Court refer to Rocky Mountain Power's arguments as 
contained in its Response in Opposition to Heber Light & Power Company's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. For the reasons set forth therein, HLP's Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief should be denied. 
B. The Commission Correctly Determined That It Has Jurisdiction Over HLP 
To The Extent HLP Exceeds Its Statutory Authority To Provide Service 
Outside The Municipal Boundaries From Surplus. 
Assuming arguendo that the Court determines it has jurisdiction to review the 
Commission's Order, the Court should affirm the Commission's decision contained in 
that Order. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 grants the Commission jurisdiction "to supervise 
and regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every 
such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically 
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of 
such power and jurisdiction . . . ." 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14(l)(d), an interlocal entity such as HLP is 
authorized to sell and deliver "product or service capacity" outside of its Municipal 
Boundaries, but only if that "product or service capacity" is "surplus." See CP National 
Corp. v. Public Service Comm 'n of Utah, 638 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1981) ("the intent of 
the [Interlocal Co-Operation Act] appears to be to allow municipalities collectively to 
exercise powers which they already possess individually") (citing Utah Code Ann. §§11-
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13-103, et seq.). In County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954), 
this Court explained what surplus product or service capacity is. The Court said: 
[T]he fears expressed by plaintiffs that cities will engage in 
the utility business on a broad scale in competition with and 
destructive of regularly authorized privately owned utilities 
does not seem to be justified. Such activities are neither 
contemplated nor authorized by law; they have no authority 
to sell [product or service capacity] outside the city limits 
except as expressly permitted by statute, which is to sell the 
'surplus product' not required by the city or its inhabitants. 
The purpose of section 10-8-14 permitting the sale of surplus 
[product or service capacity] beyond the city limits was 
obviously to eliminate the existence of any such undesirable 
situation. But such permissive sale of surplus [product or 
service capacity] is clearly not calculated to permit the city to 
purchase [product or service capacity] solely for resale, nor 
to construct, own or manage facilities and equipment for the 
distribution of [product or service capacity] outside of its city 
limits as a general business; the intent is obviously to permit 
it to do those things only to the extent incidental to the 
development and use of [product or service capacity] for 
present requirements and those reasonably to be anticipated 
in connection with the expected growth of the city. 
Another fact which would prevent cities from 
establishing and maintaining utility businesses on a 
competing basis is the temporary nature of such supply. The 
[product or service capacity] must of necessity be committed 
to the use of the city when need arises therein. Therefore, no 
long time assurance of continued supply to outside consumers 
can be given. . . . 
278 P.2d at 290 (emphasis added). 
In Re White City Water Co., 133 P.U.R.4th 62, 1992 WL 486434, * 67 (Utah PSC 
1992), the Commission interpreted the foregoing as defining surplus as a "temporary glut 
occasioned by the provision for prudent future expansion." HLP has admitted that it 
"does not provide temporary wholesale service to the unincorporated areas of Wasatch 
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County and that as part of its normal course of business it provides services to customers 
in the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County." (R. 34:4-5) (emphasis added). HLP also 
admitted that it "intends to continue to serve customers within its historic service 
territory/' which it acknowledged includes areas outside the Municipal Boundaries. 
(R. 34:4-5). HLP admitted that it has purchased resources and constructed facilities to 
provide service outside the Municipal Boundaries. (R. 20:3). Moreover, it is undisputed 
that the customers served by HLP outside the Municipal Boundaries fall within a service 
territory that the Commission, through a certificate of public convenience and necessity, 
has authorized and obligated Rocky Mountain Power to serve. (R. 34:4). 
The essence of HLP's argument is that, even though it provides continuous and 
long-term electrical service (not from surplus power) to customers outside of its 
Municipal Boundaries, the Commission does not have jurisdiction over it. HLP reaches 
Ihis conclusion through erroneous interpretations of Utah statutes and by ignoring the 
Legislature's intent and the absurd result that would follow if its interpretation were 
adopted. As discussed below, the Commission, applying applicable rules of statutory 
construction, read the statutes consistently and harmoniously to discern the Legislature's 
intent, and correctly determined that it has jurisdiction over HLP to the extent HLP is 
acting like a public utility by providing non-surplus electrical services to customers 
outside its Municipal Boundaries. 
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1. HLP Is a "Person" Under the Definition of "Electrical Corporation" in 
the Utah Utility Code, 
HLP's primary argument is that the Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
over the amended complaint based on a narrow reading of the definition of "public 
utility" in Title 54. HLP correctly states that one of the categories of "public utility" 
under Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(16)(a) is an "electrical corporation" and that an 
"electrical corporation" under section 54-2-1(7) includes "every corporation, cooperative 
association, and person" that provides electric service. (HLP's Brief at 12-13). HLP then 
argues that HLP cannot, under any circumstances, fall within the definition of a "public 
utility" in Utah, basing its argument on a strained statutory interpretation that it is not a 
"person" within the meaning of Utah utility code. 
Although HLP correctly states that the term "person" in section 54-2-2 means 
"individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, trusts and companies," HLP argues 
that it falls into none of these categories because it is a governmental entity. {Id. at 16-
19). HLP relies on the express exclusion of governmental entities from the definition of 
corporation, a 1989 amendment to the definition of person and circular reasoning to 
support its argument. In doing so, HLP commits the same error it attributes to the 
Commission—ignoring the plain language of the pertinent statutes. {Id. at 25). HLP 
offers no persuasive argument in support of its claim that it cannot be a company or an 
association and, thus, a person under section 54-2-2 and an electrical corporation under 
section 54-2-1(7). 
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Indeed, at the same time it claims that it cannot be a "company," in its pleadings 
and on its website HLP refers to itself as Heber Light and Power Company. (Emphasis 
added). HLP's own name acknowledges that it is a company. And the name is 
appropriate. The term "company" is a broad, general term that does not connote any 
particular type of business entity. For example, sole proprietorships often adopt a trade 
name that includes the word "company." Black's Law Dictionary defines "company" as: 
1. A corporation—or, less commonly, an association, 
partnership, or union—that carries on a commercial or 
industrial enterprise. 2. A corporation, partnership, 
association, joint-stock company, trust, fund, or organized 
group of persons, whether incorporated or not, and (in an 
official capacity) any receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or 
similar official, or liquidating agent, for any of the foregoing.8 
It is undisputed that HLP is an association or union of three municipalities organized for 
the "commercial purpose" of providing electric service to customers within and without 
the Municipal Boundaries. The definition is clear that while many companies are 
incorporated, the term "company" designates a much broader group of business entities 
than corporations. HLP is clearly a "company" under the plain meaning of the word and, 
therefore, a person under section 54-2-2. The fact that the definition of company includes 
corporations and associations, does not require the circular conclusion advocated by HLP 
that the Legislature intended the word company to exclude governmental entities. (HLP's 
Brief at 19). 
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) at 298 (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, by its own description, HLP is an "entity" created by three 
municipalities to provide electrical power. (HLP's Brief at 6-7). As such, it clearly falls 
within the broad term "association." There is no statutory definition of the term 
"association" as used in section 54-2-2, but the term, in its ordinary usage, is very broad. 
For example, in Cleveland Asphalt v. Coalition for a Fair and Safe Workplace, 886 A.2d 
271, 279 (Pa. Super. 2005), the issue was what constituted an "association" of employees. 
In the absence of a specific statutory definition, the court afforded "the term its plain, 
ordinary meaning." The court then turned to Black's Law Dictionary, which defined 
"association" as a "gathering of people for a common purpose; the persons so joined," 
and to Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary, which defined an association as an 
"organization of people with a common purpose and having a formal structure." Id. at 
279. The emphasis of both definitions is the grouping of two or more persons (or other 
entities) for a common purpose. Here, HLP is an entity that was created by three 
municipalities, associating themselves for the common purpose of providing electrical 
service and creating a formal structure to accomplish that purpose. By any reasonable 
definition of the term "association," HLP is one. HLP's argument that because the 
definition of corporation includes associations and because governmental entities are not 
corporations, governmental entities cannot be associations (HLP's Brief at 18-19) is 
circular and unpersuasive. 
HLP is both a "company" and an "association" and is, therefore, a "person" under 
the Utah utility code. By using broad terms like "company" and "association" in its 
definition of "person" in section 54-2-2, the Legislature clearly intended to brush broadly 
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so that an entity that would otherwise be classified as a public utility could not avoid 
Commission jurisdiction by adopting an unusual form of organization. The Legislature 
stated that corporations do not include governmental entities. It did not state that 
companies or associations do not include governmental entities. 
HLP states that a 1989 amendment to the Utah statutes eliminated the term 
"governmental entity" from the definition of "person," and thus compels the conclusion 
that HLP cannot fall within the term "person." {Id. at 16-17). The same argument was 
made to the Commission by Sandy City in White City Water, 1992 WL 486434 *65. 
After reviewing the legislative history of the amendment, the Commission concluded: 
"Our perusal of the Legislative history of this change, however, does not indicate that the 
Legislature intended to foreclose our regulation of a city's extra-territorial retail water 
customers." Id. at *65. The legislative history to which the Commission referred was 
"Transcription of House Floor Debate on SB 43 After Transmitted From the Senate Floor 
- January 28, 1989" ("Transcript"). SB 43 removed the words "government entity" from 
Ihe definition of "person."9 
A review of the legislative history reveals that the Commission correctly 
concluded that the Legislature did not intend the 1989 amendment to foreclose the 
Commission's regulation of a governmental entity that provides permanent retail service 
9
 The Transcript was attached to the reply brief of a party in White City Water. A 
copy of the Transcript, obtained from the Commission's files, and included in the record 
below (R. 30: Exhibit A), is included as Addendum 3 to this brief. 
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to extra-territorial customers in the normal course of business and not from surplus. In 
1985, Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 was amended to include the definition of "person." See 
L. Utah 1985, § 188. At the time it was added, the definition of "person" included 
"government entities." Id. In 1989, the Legislature again amended Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-2-1, this time relocating the definition of "person" from section 54-2-1 to its current 
location in section 54-2-2. See L. Utah 1989, § 20. In making this amendment, the 
Legislature also deleted "government entities" from the definition of "person." Id. 
As the Transcript makes clear, the issue addressed by the 1989 bill related to the 
concern that the 1985 amendment defining "person" to include "government entities" 
could be read to mean that the Commission was granted "general jurisdiction over all 
electrical utility systems owned by municipalities or other government entities." 
(Addendum 3; emphasis added). In other words, the concern was that the definition 
appeared to grant the Commission jurisdiction over government entities providing service 
to customers within their own municipal boundaries. The 1989 bill was passed to correct 
this unintended expansion of the Commission's jurisdiction. Thus, the bill was passed to 
correct that limited problem and not to suggest, as argued by HLP, that municipal power 
providers are under all circumstances exempt from being a "person" under the utility 
code. The legislative history does not support such an argument. 
10
 HLP's reading of section 54-2-2 by comparing it with section 54-2-1(17) prior 
to the 1989 amendment goes beyond the plain wording of section 54-2-2 and relies on 
legislative history. Thus, it was proper for the Commission and is proper for the Court to 
look at the legislative history of the amendment beyond the simple change of words in 
the statute. 
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2. The Commission's Statutory Analysis Is Consistent with Applicable 
Rules of Statutory Construction Used to Discern the Legislature's 
Intent. 
HLP argues that the Commission has, based on unsupported speculation as to the 
intent of the Legislature, unlawfully rewritten the utility code to give the Commission 
jurisdiction over a governmental entity. HLP attempts to support this argument by 
suggesting that it was error for the Commission to consider the meaning of statutes in the 
Public Utility Code in conjunction with statutes in the Utah Municipal Code and the Utah 
Interlocal Cooperation Act. (HLP's Brief at 24-29). A review of the Commission's 
analysis in the Order, however, demonstrates that the Commission has read all of the 
relevant statutes together in the only reasonable way they can be read and that the 
relevant statutes include those dealing with provision of electric service by municipalities 
and interlocal entities. 
The Commission first noted that if sections 54-2-1 and 11-13-20 l(2)(a) are read in 
complete isolation, HLP would not be subject to Commission jurisdiction. (R. 34:14). 
But the Commission, quite correctly and in reliance on Hansen v. Eyre, 2003 UT App 
274,17, 74 P.3d 1182, noted that statutes must be read together ("as a whole"), and that 
this process includes statutes from "related chapters." "If... the understanding of the 
legislature or the persons affected by the statute would be influenced by another statute, 
then those statutes should be construed with reference to one another and harmonized if 
possible"' (R 34:14-15; emphasis added). Therefore, the Commission properly rejected 
HLP's argument that the Commission is required to, in effect, treat the relevant statutes 
as isolated islands in the code that neither affect nor are affected by each other. 
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The Commission first analyzed the statutes that apply to individual municipalities. 
Reading these statutes and CP National and County Water System, the Commission 
concluded that municipalities may not sell or deliver a product or service that is not 
surplus outside their boundaries. (R. 34:15-18). The next step in the Commission's 
statutory analysis was to examine the statutes that define the powers of interlocal 
agencies (which are merely combinations of government agencies, including 
municipalities). There, the Commission, relying on specific language from sections 11-
13-213(1) & (2) and 11-13-203, correctly concluded that an interlocal agency comprised 
of municipalities has no greater powers than its individual members. (R. 34:17-18).11 
The Commission reasonably concluded that "if municipalities may not sell and deliver -
product or service that is not surplus to those outside their boundaries, then neither may 
interlocals organized by those municipalities." (R. 34:18). 
The final element of the Commission's analysis was its discussion of legislative 
intent through the application of rules of statutory construction. On this issue, the 
Commission quoted CP National for the proposition that rules of statutory construction 
are helpful if they assist in discerning the intent of the Legislature: "In determining that 
intent the statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it was designed to serve 
11
 The Commission's conclusion is buttressed further by Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-
102, the section that defines the purposes of the Interlocal Cooperation Act. Among 
those purposes are to allow government entities to "make the most efficient use of their 
powers," to enable "cooperation" in the provision of services, and to "provide the benefit 
of economy of scale." Noticeably absent from the purposes of the statute is any reference 
to allowing governmental entities to form interlocal entities for the purpose of doing 
things collectively that they could not do individually. 
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and so applied as to carry out that purpose if that can be done consistent with its 
language." (R. 34:19). With that in mind, the Commission concluded: "The legislature 
did not intend to leave a gap for governmental agencies, like interlocals, to form what are 
essentially unregulated utilities in an effort to target and serve non-resident customers in 
an effort to compete with certificated utilities." (R. 34:20). Relying on CP National for 
the proposition that allowing municipalities the unfettered power to serve outside their 
boundaries would place non-residents "at the mercy of officials over whom they have no 
control at the ballot box," the Commission denied HLP's motion. (R. 34:20). 
The Commission's analysis fully interrelates the relevant statutes, reads them 
harmoniously, and concludes, with the assistance of pointed language from the courts and 
earlier Commission decisions, that the Legislature did not intend to allow municipalities 
or interlocal entities unfettered power to provide completely unregulated services 
wherever and to whomever they chose. Any other conclusion would violate another rule 
of statutory construction: that a statute not be read to produce an absurd result and thus 
defeat the Legislature's intent. The absurdity of HLP's argument is addressed in part 
VI.B.5, below. 
12
 Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 108 (Utah 1944) ("[W]e are 
cognizant of the fact that we are not following the literal wording of the statute, but such 
is not required when to do so would defeat legislative intent and make the statute 
absurd."); GAF Corp., 760 P.2d at 313 ("It is axiomatic that a statute should be given a 
reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or 
unreasonable result.") (citation omitted). 
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HLP claims that the in para materia rule of construction was erroneously used by 
the Commission because section 54-4-1 is clear and unambiguous and because the Utah 
Municipal Code and Utah Interlocal Cooperation Act are not related to Commission 
jurisdiction under the Public Utility Code. (HLP's Brief at 27-29). Neither part of this 
claim is correct. 
Contrary to HLP's assumption, the Commission did not rely solely or even 
primarily on section 54-4-1 in support of its conclusion that it may have jurisdiction over 
HLP's extraterritorial service. Rather, the Commission discussed the parties' positions 
on the statutes defining public utilities subject to its jurisdiction {see, e.g. R. 34:7, 13-14) 
and, as noted above, reviewed those definitions in the context of the limitations in Titles 
10 and 11 of the code on the power of municipalities and interlocal entities to provide 
extraterritorial electric service. (R. 34:14-20). In so doing, the Commission followed the 
direction of CP National to apply rules of statutory construction that focus on the purpose 
of the statute. Thus, understanding the purpose of the Legislature's exclusion of 
governmental entities from the definition of "corporations" in section 54-2-1(5)—relied 
on by HLP as the primary reason that the statute is clear—is assisted by understanding 
the purpose for limiting the authorized role of governmental entities in Titles 10 and 11 
of the Utah Code. The Commission ultimately concluded that the Legislature's use of 
broad terms such as "corporation, association, etc." was intended to avoid a gap that 
would otherwise allow municipal utilities to provide service outside their municipal 
boundaries without any regulation. (R. 34:20). 
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Rocky Mountain Power agrees that when HLP provides electric service to 
residents of Heber, Midway, or Charleston, it is not acting as a public utility subject to 
Commission regulation under Title 54 of the Utah Code. But that is not the issue in this 
case. The issue here is the status of HLP when it serves customers outside the Municipal 
Boundaries as a part of its ongoing business and not on a temporary basis from surplus. 
On that issue, the Commission has reasonably interpreted all of the relevant Utah statutes 
and has demonstrated that nothing in them gives HLP the right to do so without 
regulation by the Commission. To the contrary, when HLP acts beyond its governmental 
authority, it is no longer performing a municipal function exempt from Commission 
regulation. 
3. HLP's Claim that the Commission Determined that a "Gap" Exists in 
the Statutes Misinterprets the Order and Is Erroneous. 
HLP claims the Commission determined that a "gap" existed in its statutory 
jurisdiction. (HLP's Brief at 22.) This argument is a blatant misinterpretation of the 
Commission's Order. Nowhere in the Order does the Commission conclude that a "gap" 
exists. The Order refers to a "gap" twice. The first reference asks whether—given that 
the Legislature did not explicitly speak on the subject of what happens if a municipality 
or interlocal agency exceeds its authority by providing service outside of municipal 
boundaries—"the legislature intended for this apparent 'gap' to allow an interlocal to 
compete in such a manner." (R. 34:19; emphasis added). The second reference clarifies 
the first; "[t]he legislature did not intend to leave a gap for governmental agencies, like 
interlocals, to form what are essentially unregulated public utilities in an effort to target 
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and serve non-resident customers in an effort to compete with certified utilities." 
(R. 34:20). Thus, the Commission never agreed that there was a "gap" in its "statutory 
jurisdiction." 
There is a fundamental difference between agreeing that a "gap" exists, as claimed 
by HLP, and suggesting that there is an "apparent gap" and then explaining why the 
"apparent gap" does not, in reality, exist. To that point, HLP ignores the sentence 
immediately following the reference to the "apparent gap" in the Order: "When viewing 
all the statutes governing interlocals and related statutes, those governing Commission 
jurisdiction, and case law interpreting these statutes, the answer [to the question whether 
the Legislature intended to leave a gap] is no" (R. 34:19; emphasis added). In other 
words, the Commission's ruling was that, after reading all related statutes consistently 
and harmoniously, no jurisdictional gap exists. 
4. CP'Nation'^/Does Not Compel the Conclusion that the Commission 
Lacks Jurisdiction Over HLP's Service Outside the Municipal 
Boundaries, 
HLP argues that the Court's mention of Commission jurisdiction in CP National 
denies the Commission jurisdiction over HLP's extraterritorial service. (HLP's Brief at 
27). This argument reads too much into the Court's statement and applies it out of 
context. 
In CP National, the Court was faced with the question whether an interlocal entity 
formed by several municipalities could condemn an existing, operating public utility 
business with both tangible and intangible assets. After careful statutory analysis and 
reference to cases in other jurisdictions, the Court concluded that the condemnation 
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authority of municipalities does not extend to condemnation of an entire operating utility 
business. CP National, 638 P.2d at 524. The Court then stated that its conclusion was 
also supported by the limitation on operation of municipal power systems outside their 
borders in section 10-8-14. Id. Noting that the utility system the interlocal entity sought 
to condemn included service in areas outside the borders of the members, the Court 
observed that a justification for the limitation was that municipal power systems are not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission and that non-residents of the municipalities 
would not be able to turn to the Commission for relief. Id. 
The issue here is not whether the HLP may condemn all or part of Rocky 
Mountain Power's utility business. It is whether HLP may operate beyond the limitation 
on its authority in section 10-8-14 in a manner that conflicts with Rocky Mountain 
Power's service to customers it is obligated to serve under the supervision and regulation 
of the Commission. The Commission's conclusion in the Order that it has jurisdiction to 
determine whether by exceeding its authority HLP has removed itself from the exemption 
from regulation otherwise applicable to municipal power systems is not contrary to the 
holding of CP National. 
The fact that HLP is reading too much into the Court's passing statement in CP 
National is supported by Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977). 
In that case, the Court made an observation similar to that made in CP National The 
Court was asked to determine whether the County could obtain declaratory judgment 
regarding the City's duty to continue to provide water service and whether its operations 
in the County were so extensive that it should be subject to regulation by the Commission 
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with regard to that service. Id, at 120. The issue addressed by the Court was whether the 
district court had erred in determining that declaratory judgment was not available. Id. 
The Court reversed, holding that a justiciable controversy existed and that declaratory 
judgment was available. Id. at 121. In that context, the Court made some tentative 
observations on the questions presented to aid the district court. Id. One of the tentative 
observations was that Salt Lake City's provision of water to Salt Lake County residents 
was not subject to regulation by the Commission because it derived the authority to 
furnish water to its residents from the Utah Constitution and its provision of water to 
County residents was incidental to that authority. Id. The Court also noted that "to just 
however great an extent a city may engage in rendering a utility service outside the city 
limits without being subject to some public regulation is not so clearly determined." Id. 
Rocky Mountain Power believes that when the Commission is allowed to hear the 
evidence in this case, it will conclude that HLP, by its unique competitive practices, has 
crossed the line alluded to in Salt Lake County and is clearly subject to regulation with 
regard to its service outside the Municipal Boundaries. But that determination can only 
be made if the Court dismisses HLP's Petition for Review {see Point VI. A, above) or 
affirms the Commission's Order and allows the Commission to apply its special expertise 
to that issue. 
5. Taken to Its Logical Extreme, HLP's Position Is that It Has Unfettered 
Discretion, Without Regulatory Oversight, to Provide Electrical 
Service Anywhere It Chooses to Do So. 
One of the strongest arguments against HLP's strained construction of the relevant 
statutes is a simple common sense argument. The argument that HLP makes in its brief, 
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if taken to its logical conclusion, is that HLP (and any other interlocal entity or municipal 
power system) has the right to serve customers anywhere in Utah, irrespective of the 
Commission's grant of certificates to privately-owned public utilities like Rocky 
Mountain Power, and that no limitations on that power can be placed upon it by the 
Commission. As the prior analysis demonstrates, that is not the law of Utah.13 
Once a municipality or group of municipalities decides to expand service beyond 
their boundaries, the powers and jurisdiction of the Commission must come into play 
unless the service is from temporary surplus incidental to the reasonably anticipated 
future needs of the municipalities' constituents. Not only is that conclusion consistent 
with the law of Utah, it is mandated by common sense. If the world were as HLP claims 
it to be, then the power of the Commission to bring rational oversight to the provision of 
a critical service to the public outside the boundaries of governmental utilities would be 
Although HLP has not contended that its service outside the Municipal 
Boundaries is from surplus, any such claim would also produce an absurd result. If 
HLP's service outside the Municipal Boundaries, which it admits it has been providing 
for nearly one hundred years (HLP's Brief at 6-7), is from surplus, then surplus must 
simply mean any capacity that is surplus to the capacity currently needed to serve 
customers within the Municipal Boundaries regardless of whether that capacity has been 
obtained to serve the reasonably foreseeable needs of customers within the Municipal 
Boundaries. If that is the case, the only limitation on a municipality or interlocal entity to 
expand its service beyond its boundaries is its own ability to acquire capacity. Such a 
definition of "surplus" would be absurd. County Water Systems correctly noted that this 
"undesirable situation" could not occur because the surplus referenced in section 10-8-14 
was surplus "only to the extent incidental to the development and use of [the utility 
product] for present requirements and those reasonably to be anticipated in connection 
with the expected growth of the city" and was "temporary." 278 P.2d at 290. 
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eliminated and the result would be chaos. That is not what the Legislature intended, nor 
is it what the statutes, Commission orders, or court decisions conclude. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss HLP's Petition for Review or 
affirm the Commission's Order. The Order is not a final agency action. Therefore, this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to review it. Nor has HLP shown that it is entitled to 
extraordinary relief. Moreover, even assuming this Court finds that it has jurisdiction, the 
Court should nevertheless affirm the Commission's Order. The Commission correctly 
determined, relying on applicable principles of statutory interpretation and case law, that 
it will have jurisdiction over HLP to the extent it determines that HLP's sales of power 
outside the Municipal Boundaries are beyond its governmental authority. 
DATED: June 4, 2008. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gregory B. Monson 
Scott S. Newman 
Stoel Rives LLP 
Mark C. Moench 
R. Jeff Richards 
Rocky Mountain Power 
Attorneys for Rocky Mountain Power 
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Tabl 
Utah Code 8 10-8-14 
Water, sewer, gas, electricity, and public transportation—Service beyond city 
limits—Retainage—Cable television and public telecommunications services. 
(1) A city may: 
(a) construct, maintain, and operate waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment 
systems, gas works, electric light works, telecommunications lines, cable television lines, 
or public transportation systems; 
(b) authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the works or systems 
listed in Subsection (l)(a) by others; 
(c) purchase or lease the works or systems listed in Subsection (l)(a) from any person 
or corporation; and 
(d) sell and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of any works or system 
listed in Subsection (l)(a), not required by the city or the city's inhabitants, to others 
beyond the limits of the city, except the sale and delivery of cable television services or 
public telecommunications services is governed by Subsection (3). 
(2) If any payment on a contract with a private person, firm, or corporation to 
construct waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, electric light 
works, telecommunications lines, cable television lines, or public transportation systems 
is retained or withheld, it shall be retained or withheld and released as provided in 
Section 13-8-5. 
(3) A city's actions under this section related to works or systems involving public 
telecommunications services or cable television services are subject to the requirements 
of Chapter 18, Municipal Cable Television and Public Telecommunications Services Act. 
Utah Code 8 54-2-1 
Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
(5) (a) "Corporation" includes an association, and a joint stock company having any 
powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships. 
(b) "Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, 
improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any 
general or special law of this state. 
(7) "Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative association, and 
person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing 
any electric plant, or in any way furnishing electric power for public service or to its 
consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, within this state, 
except independent energy producers, and except where electricity is generated on or 
distributed by the producer solely for the producers own use, or the use of the producer's 
tenants, or for the use of members of an association of unit owners formed under Title 57, 
Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership Act, and not for sale to the public generally. 
(16) (a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical 
corporation, distribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, 
telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, 
heat corporation, and independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d), 
where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally, 
or in the case of a gas corporation or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is 
sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, 
or industrial use. 
(b) (i) If any railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, 
telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, 
heat corporation, or independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d), 
performs a service for or delivers a commodity to the public, it is considered to be a 
public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title. 
(ii) If a gas corporation, independent energy producer not described in Subsection 
(16)(d), or electrical corporation sells or furnishes gas or electricity to any member or 
consumers within the state, for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, for which any 
compensation or payment is received, it is considered to be a public utility, subject to the 
jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title. 
Utah Code 8 54-2-2 
Definition of "person." 
As used in this chapter, "person" includes all individuals, corporations, partnerships, 
associations, trusts, and companies and their lessees, trustees, and receivers. 
Utah Code 8 63G-4-401 
Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in 
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this 
chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust 
any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 
days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents 
and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
Utah Code g 63G-4-403 
Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action 
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code § 78A-3-102 
Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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) STOEL RIVES 8.L.C 
In the Matter of the Complaint of Rocky ) 
Mountain Power, a division of PacifiCorp, ) DOCKET NO. 07-035-22 
against Heber Light & Power Regarding ) 
Unauthorized Service by Heber Light & Power ) 
in Areas Certificated to Rocky Mountain ) REPORT AND ORDER 
Power ) 
ISSUED: November 3, 2008 
By The Commission: 
THIS MATTER is before the Public Service Commission (Commission) on 
Heber Light and Power's (HL&P) Motion to Dismiss. HL&P moved to dismiss Rocky Mountain 
Power's (RMP) Complaint, arguing the Commission lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
RMP's Complaint. On October 2, 2008, the Commission held a hearing on the Motion. Messrs. 
Joseph Dunbeck of Dunbeck & Moss and Gary Dodge of Hatch James & Dodge represented 
HL&P. Mr. Dunbeck argued on behalf of HL&P. Mr. Gregory Monson of Stoel Rives, LLP 
represented RMP. Mr. Michael Ginsberg appeared for the Division of Public Utilities 
(Division). The Commission, having reviewed the moving and responding papers, having heard 
oral arguments from the parties, and being otherwise fully appraised in the matter, hereby 
DENIES HL&P's Motion. 
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 
RMP's Original Complaint 
On April 18, 2007, RMP filed its original Complaint against HL&P raising five 
causes of action. Generally, RMP alleged that HL&P violated RMP's certificate, usurpation of 
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Commission jurisdiction, violation of U.C.A. § 10-8-14 (Municipal Code), violation of U.C.A. § 
11-3-304 (Interlocal Act), and violation of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. RMP 
sought declaratory relief in relation to the alleged violations. Namely, RMP asked the 
Commission to 1) order HL&P cease providing electric service to customers outside its Member 
Cities' boundaries and within RMP's certificated areas; 2) find that the actions of HL&P in 
concert with Wasatch County in attempting to determine Rocky Mountain's service area are 
unlawful; 3) find that the electric service provided by HL&P to retail customers outside of its 
Member Cities' boundaries is in violation of the Municipal Code; 4) find that HL&P failed to 
obtain one or more certificates of public convenience and necessity in violation of the Interlocal 
Cooperation Act; and 5) declare that the electric service provided by HL&P to retail customers 
within the Rocky Mountain service area is a taking of RMP's property. 
The Stays 
There were two stays granted in this action. The Commission granted the first on 
June 5, 2007 and the second on August 8, 2007. During the stays, the parties attempted to 
resolve their disputes but were not successful. 
RMP's Original Complaint 
On February 5, 2008, RMP filed its Amended Complaint. In its jurisdictional 
allegations, RMP alleged as follows: 
The Commission has jurisdiction over this Amended Complaint because 
HL&P is providing retail electrical service to customers outside the municipal 
boundaries of its Member Cities [] in violation of Rocky Mountain Power's 
Certificate and Utah law. The electrical service provided by HL&P is not the 
temporary wholesale of surplus product or service capacity, but is rather part of a 
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pattern of providing permanent, continuous, and expanding retail service in the 
normal course of business to customers outside the Municipal Boundaries. 
Although the Commission does not have jurisdiction over municipalities 
providing utility service within their municipal boundaries or making legitimate 
temporary wholesale sales of surplus product or service capacity outside of their 
municipal boundaries, the Commission is authorized to prohibit continuous retail 
service by municipalities outside of their municipal boundaries because in so doing 
the municipalities are not engaged in a municipal function authorized by Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-14 and because customers of the municipalities located outside of their 
municipal boundaries have no control over the policies and actions of the 
municipalities because they are not able to vote for the elected public officials who 
set such policies and authorize such actions. 
The Commission also has jurisdiction over this Amended Complaint because, 
on information and belief, HL&P has constructed generating plants and transmission 
lines without obtaining a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity from the Commission in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-304. 
RMP Amended Complaint, ^ | 3-5. 
RMP's Amended Complaint 
RMP filed an Amended Complaint. In it, RMP requested the Commission make 
findings to determine: 1) whether HL&P has "surplus product or service capacity" and, if so, the 
amount of HL&P's "surplus product or service capacity"; 2) whether the sale of "surplus product 
or service capacity" must be restricted to temporary wholesale sales or may be to retail 
customers on a continuing basis; 3) the geographic area in which RMP is obligated to serve if the 
Commission determines HL&P has authority to provide retail electric service to customers 
outside boundaries of the Member Cities' boundaries; and 4) if the Commission determines 
HL&P has authority to provide retail electric service to customers outside its Member Cities' 
boundaries, that the Commission amend RMP's Certificate to exclude those areas from RMP's 
certificated areas. 
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HL&P'S Answer to Amended Complaint 
On April 7, 2008, HL&P answered RMP's Amended Complaint. Besides the 
general denials, admissions, and affirmative allegations to RMP's Amended Complaint listed in 
its First Defense, HL&P also raised five other defenses. Its Second Defense alleges the 
Commission lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues contained in RMP's 
Complaint or grant the relief requested by RMP. In its Third Defense, HL&P raised defenses of 
abandonment, forfeiture, waiver, estoppel, and laches, arguing that RMP has been aware of and 
encouraged HL&P's development of electric service to the Heber Valley. In its Fourth Defense, 
HL&P argues RMP abandoned or forfeited its rights and obligation to provide service to the 
Heber Valley and unincorporated areas of Heber Valley. The Fifth Defense claims RMP has 
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. In its Sixth Defense, HL&P makes an 
equitable argument, stating that it should be allowed to continue serving its customers within its 
historical service area. 
Key Factual Allegations and Admissions 
RMP has made certain factual allegations, and HL&P has admitted some facts 
that are relevant to this Order. HL&P is an energy services interlocal entity formed under the 
Interlocal Act by Heber City, Midway, and the Town of Charleston (Member Cities). RMP 
Amended Complaint, f 2, HL&P Answer, f 2. It provides electric service to individuals living 
within the Member Cities' boundaries and also to individuals outside of those boundaries—in 
unincorporated areas of Wasatch County. HL&P Answer, \ 3. HL&P admits that it "does not 
provide temporary wholesale service to the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County and that as 
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part of its normal course of business it provides services to customers in the unincorporated areas 
of Wasatch County." HL&P Answer, ^ 3. HL&P also admits that it "intends to continue to serve 
customers within its historic service territory," i.e. customers outside its Member Cities' 
boundaries. Id. at^ 11. RMP has franchises from Wasatch County as early as 1917 authorizing 
it to provide electric service to residents of Wasatch County, RMP Amended Complaint, ^ 7, 
HL&P Answer, Tf 7; its current franchise expires in 2010, RMP Amended Complaint, ^ 7, HL&P 
Answer, f 7. RMP also has a certificate from the Commission authorizing it to provide electric 
service to customers in Wasatch County. RMP Amended Complaint, f 8. Both RMP and HL&P 
provide electric service to customers in the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County. RMP 
Amended Complaint, f 6, HL&P Answer, f6. 
HL&P's Motion to Dismiss and Reply 
Concurrently with the filing of its Answer, HL&P filed its Motion to Dismiss and 
supporting Memorandum. HL&P generally argued that because it was an interlocal entity and 
political subdivision of Utah, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to determine the extent of its 
authority to serve its customers and define its service territory boundaries. HL&P notes that 
U.C.A. 54-4-1 explicitly gives the Commission authority over public utilities— including 
electrical corporations, but that HL&P is not an electrical corporation. Under U.C.A. 54-2-
l(5)(b), governmental entities are excluded from the definition of "corporation." Additionally, 
neither is HL&P a "person" under U.C.A. 54-2-2, nor is it an "association" or "company" 
subject to Commission jurisdiction, something not contemplated by applicable statutes. HL&P 
contends that RMP's arguments to classify HL&P as a "company" or "association" simply 
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because HL&P is a "business organized by its members to provide electric service" would make 
each municipal electric utility subject to Commission jurisdiction. HL&P further reasons that 
the 1989 amendment to U.C.A. 54-2-2, removing the term "governmental entity" from the 
definition of "person", clearly shows the Legislature's intent to remove entities such as HL&P 
from Commission jurisdiction. 
HL&P further contends that RMP and the Division's reliance on the 
Commission's 1992 White City Water Company decision, Docket No. 91-018-02 (White City)1 is 
mistaken. HL&P contends White City water is either distinguishable, or in the alternative, was 
wrongly decided. HL&P contends White City is distinguishable, first, because the Commission 
merely decided to retain jurisdiction over a company over which it already had jurisdiction. Part 
of the Commission's rationale for retaining jurisdiction was that when Sandy acquired the 
company, it also took on "all its regulatory baggage." HL&P contends that, here, it is not 
acquiring a public utility, so the Commission cannot "retain jurisdiction" over an entity which it 
has never regulated. Secondly, the Commission plainly stated that it was only asserting 
jurisdiction to nullify rate discrimination, not to assert jurisdiction over Sandy or to determine its 
service area. Therefore, it is inapplicable in this case where RMP does want the Commission to 
assert jurisdiction over HL&P and determine its service area. 
In White City, Sandy City contracted with White City Water Company to purchase the company's water 
system and intended to operate the company as a municipal utility Some of the water company's customers, 
however, were non-residents of Sandy and would be charged higher rates than Sandy residents White City Water 
applied to the Commission for an order approving the transfer of all its stock to Sandy. It also sought a declaratory 
judgment that the system, under Sandy control, would constitute a municipal water system As such, it would be free 
of Commission jurisdiction—both with regards to customers within and without Sandy city boundaries. In White 
City, the Commission ultimately determined that Sandy was not performing a municipal function—insofar as its 
service to non-residents was concerned, and thereby was subject to Commission jurisdiction in that aspect 
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HL&P also contends, in the alternative, that the White City decision should be 
overruled. HL&P contends the Commission decided the matter upon public policy 
considerations, and nowhere listed a statute explicitly authorizing the Commission to assume 
jurisdiction. The Commission merely reasoned that the possibility that Sandy might discriminate 
against extra-territorial customers, required Commission jurisdiction to regulate Sandy's rates 
and protect disenfranchised customers. But because no statute explicitly gives the Commission 
jurisdiction over HL&P, it argues the Commission must dismiss the Complaint and allow a civil 
court to resolve the disputes between RMP & HL&P. 
BMP's Response to the Motion 
RMP responded to HL&P's Motion. RMP first argued that HL&P is subject to 
the Commission's jurisdiction because it qualifies as a "person" under § 54-2-1(7) (a)'s 
definition of "electrical corporation." A "person" under § 54-2-2 means "individuals, 
corporations, partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies." Even if it is a "political 
subdivision", HL&P qualifies as a "company", RMP argues, because it is an "association, 
partnership, or union—that carries on a commercial or industrial enterprise," or an association or 
union of three cities organized for the commercial purpose of providing electric service to 
customers within and without Member Cities' boundaries. Additionally, the legislature's 
deletion of the term "governmental entity" from the definition of "person" in § 54-2-2 did not 
exempt HL&P from all Commission regulation, but merely served to bolster the notion that the 
Commission did not generally have jurisdiction over municipal power providers, or entities like 
HL&P. Additionally, RMP contends HL&P's arguments regarding its exemption from 
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provisions of the Interlocal Act are not relevant because the issue is not just whether HL&P is 
subject to Commission oversight for construction of generation plants and transmission lines 
under § 1 l-13-204(2)(a)(I), but also whether HL&P is exempt from Commission oversight for its 
provision of product and service into areas outside its Member Cities' boundaries. 
RMP cites the White City water case as a basis for jurisdiction. Based on White 
City's precedent, the Commission clearly has jurisdiction in this case, RMP contends. In White 
City the Commission decided to regulate Sandy's provision of water to non-Sandy residents for 
the following reasons: 1) disenfranchised non-residents would not be able to prevent Sandy from 
charging them excessively; 2) because Sandy was also an entity of limited jurisdiction like the 
Commission, Sandy might possibly have to assume the Commission's role in regulating rates of 
non-residents, which would be inappropriate; and 3) Sandy was not performing a municipal 
function by proving water to customers outside its boundaries and therefore subjected itself to 
regulation. RMP suggest the same reasons supporting Commission jurisdiction in White City are 
present here. 
RMP also argued that its Complaint goes to another key issue—the nature and 
extent of RMP'S obligation to serve in Wasatch County. The Commission was the authority that 
issued RMP'S certificate and determined the certificated area. RMP claims the Commission is 
the only body with the authority and expertise to regulate RMP's service obligation, including 
determining whether RMP has abandoned or forfeited part of its certificate, or whether HL&P 
has obtained a right to serve the disputed areas by passage of time. ^ 
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Finally, RMP argues that, taken to its logical end, HL&P's argument would mean 
that HL&P and "any other interlocal entity or municipal power system has the power to serve 
electric customers anywhere in Utah . . . . and that no limitations on that power can be placed 
upon it by the Commission." This is not what the legislature intended and therefore, the Motion 
must be denied. 
The Division's Response to the Motion 
The Division also responded to HL&P's Motion. The Division first argued that 
under White City's rationale, the Commission should deny the Motion and allow the matter to 
proceed. The Division stated that White City held that under certain circumstances the 
Commission might have jurisdiction over a city's provision of service outside of its municipal 
boundaries. Like Sandy City in White City, HL&P is selling services outside of its 
municipalities' boundaries. The sale of the services was not the sale of surplus services. 
Additionally, the non-resident customers outside of Sandy City had no say in Sandy governance. 
The Division contends similar circumstances exist here. It argues the Commission must assume 
jurisdiction to protect disenfranchised customers. The Division stated that given the precedent 
already established by White City, the facts alleged by RMP and answers and defenses put forth 
by HL&P, and the lack of controlling opinion from the Supreme Court on the issue, the 
Commission should retain jurisdiction to determine if the White City case controls. 
The Division also argues that the Commission must assume jurisdiction to clarify 
the uncertainties that exist with regards to the obligations of RMP to serve residents in 
unincorporated areas of Wasatch County, especially in newer developments where there is 
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confusion as to whether HL&P or RMP has the obligation to serve. The Division contends that 
had HL&P not been an interlocal, the Commission would certainly have jurisdiction to regulate 
it in the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County. Because non-residents served by HL&P have 
no other authority to turn to, the Commission should assume jurisdiction. 
Finally, the Division reasons that because HL&P is prohibited from serving non-
residents with services that are not surplus, the Commission can be the only proper authority 
with jurisdiction to determine who has the obligation to serve residents in unincorporated areas 
of Wasatch County. The Division notes that Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
authorizes cities to provide public utilities which are "local in extent and use." Section 10-8-14 
of the Utah Code allows municipalities to sell and deliver product or services to non-residents 
that are surplus. Article VI, Section 28, states only that the Commission cannot interfere with a 
municipalities municipal functions, but does not expressly prohibit the Commission from 
regulating municipalities when they are not performing municipal functions. Also, the Division 
cites to County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954), Salt Lake County v. 
Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977), and CP National Corp. v. Public Service Comm 'n, 
638 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1981) to support its proposition that HL&P's Member Cities cannot sell 
or deliver non-surplus product or services to non-residents. It recognizes that although no case is 
squarely on point, those three cited cases, together with the constitutional and statutory 
provisions cited, make it clear that HL&P cannot provide the service it is providing. This being 
the case, only the Commission has the jurisdiction to clarify any uncertainties, regulate HL&P 
outside is Member Cities' boundaries, and protect disenfranchised customers. 
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ANALYSIS 
Standard for Motion to Dismiss 
HL&P has made a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Commission Rules do not squarely address how the Commission should treat such a motion. In 
light of this, R746-100-1.C provides that "[i]n situations for which there is no provision in these 
rules, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern . . . ." Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is the vehicle for HL&P's Motion. It states HL&P may make its motion to 
dismiss for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter." There is little, if any, Utah 
case law on how to address a 12(b)(1) Motion. Federal case law, however, is instructive.2 
Motions to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction take two forms. One form is where the 
defendant attacks the "sufficiency of the complaint's allegations as to the subject matter 
jurisdiction", City of Albuquerque v. United States DOI, 379 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2004), as 
HL&P has done here. In such a case, the adjudicator must presume all the allegations in the 
complaint are true. See id. at 906. Therefore, the Commission will presume RMP's factual 
allegations are true. 
Assumed Factual Allegations 
RMP makes two central factual allegations that it states, argue for Commission 
jurisdiction and against dismissal. First, RMP alleges HL&P is providing non-temporary, non-
surplus product or service capacity to areas outside of the Member Cities' boundaries. 
Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedme aie peisuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are "substantially similar" to the federal rules. Lund v Brown, 2000 UT 75, ^ 26. Utah Rule 12 and 
federal Rule 12 are substantially similar 
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Complaint, Tj ^ 3-4. HL&P admits it "does not provide temporary wholesale service to the 
unincorporated areas of Wasatch County and that as part of its normal course of business it 
provides services to customers in the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County," HL&P Answer, 
T| 3. Additionally, HL&P admits it "intends to continue to serve customers within its historic 
service territory," i.e. customers outside its Member Cities' boundaries. In essence, RMP 
argues, HL&P is acting just like a private commercial enterprise—a public utility, in providing 
such service outside its Member Cities' boundaries.3 Second, RMP states that because some 
HL&P customers live outside Member City boundaries and cannot vote, they will have no means 
of preventing HL&P from charging excessive rates or providing inadequate srvice, if HL&P is 
not subject to Commission jurisdiction. 
In sum, because applicable law only allows HL&P to provide service and 
capacity to customers within its Member Cities' boundaries, any service outside those 
boundaries subjects HL&P to Commission jurisdiction, RMP argues. RMP also argues the 
Commission must have jurisdiction for protection of extra-territorial customers, as the 
Commission has the expertise and was created to protect just such customers. 
HL&P Argues it is Exempt from Jurisdiction 
HL&P counters that even assuming, arguendo, the facts alleged above are true, 
and even while recognizing RMP's legal and public policy arguments for what HL&P cannot or 
should not do, factual allegations mixed with public policy considerations provide no statutory 
3At the hearing, HL&P presented a map showing its "service area.' The boundaries of HL&P's service area 
he within Wasatch County and have been demarcated by the County. HL&P admits its service area overlaps areas 
for which RMP has a certificate from the Commission. 
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basis foi Commission jurisdiction Because the Commission is a creatuie of statute, it can "only 
assert those [powers] which are expressly granted or clearly implied as necessary to the 
discharge of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it " Hi-Country Estates HO A v Bagley 
&Co , 901 P 2d 1017, 1021 (Utah 1995) Even where there might be important public policy 
considerations, HL&P argues, if there is reasonable doubt that the Commission has jurisdiction, 
then "any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power must be resolved against exercise 
thereof" Hi-Country Estates, 901 P 2d at 1021 HL&P claims that RMP has cited no statute 
which explicitly gives the Commission jurisdiction over an interlocal providing non-temporary 
services to extra-territorial customers 
In fact, HL&P argues that it is explicitly exempt from Commission jurisdiction 
U C A 54-4-1 states the Commission is "vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and 
regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public 
utility m this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or m addition 
thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction " 
U C A 54-2-l(16)(a) states that a "'public utility'" includes every electrical corporation 
" An electrical corporation includes "every corporation, cooperative association, and person 
owning, controlling, operating, or managing any electric plant, or m any way furnishing electric 
power for public service or to its consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or industrial 
use, within this state " U CA 54-2-1(7) Section 54-2-1 states that an electrical corporation 
is not defined as "towns, cities, counties or other governmental units created or organized 
under any general or special law of this state " One governmental unit that may be created 
DOCKET NO. 07-035-22 
-14-
"under any general or special law of this state" is an interlocal entity. Two or more Utah public 
agencies, such as the Member Cities, may enter into an agreement with one another to create an 
energy service interlocal entity under U.C.A. 1 l-13-203(4)(a). Therefore, under § 54-2-1, 
HL&P is an energy service interlocal entity explicitly exempt from jurisdiction. HL&P 
additionally argues that U.C.A. § 1 l-13-204(2)(a) explicitly exempts it from the Project Entity 
Provisions, U.C.A. § 11-13-304. In this instance, given that it is an interlocal entity, HL&P 
contends the statutes are plain on their face. There is no commission jurisdiction over it. The 
Commission must grant the Motion, dismiss the Complaint, and let a district court resolve the 
dispute. 
Interpretation of Applicable Statutes 
If the Commission reads the plain language of sections 54-2-1 and 11-13-
204(2)(a) in isolation, as HL&P urges, then it would require HL&P exemption from Commission 
jurisdiction. However, in attempting to interpret the statutes governing HL&P, the Commission 
must read "the plain language of a statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony 
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Hansen v. Eyre, 2003 UT App 
274, ^ 7 (emphasis added). 
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia and thus must be construed together 
when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, 
or have the same purpose or object. If. .. the understanding of the legislature or of 
persons affected by the statute would be influenced by another statute, then those 
statutes should be construed with reference to one another and harmonized if 
possible. 
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Id. The Commission must look at the statute "in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose 
which was sought to be accomplished." State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Therefore, it is appropriate for the Commission to read those sections upon which 
HL&P bases it argument for exemption in relation to the other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters, and harmonize those sections with other statutes that affect interlocals 
generally. 
Interlocal Act and Municipal Powers 
The intent of the Interlocal Act was to allow municipalities to collectively 
exercise the powers its municipal members already possess. See CP National, 638 P.2d at 521 
(holding the "intent of the act appears to be to allow municipalities collectively to exercise 
powers which they already possess individually.") Section 10-8-14(1) lists some of the powers 
municipalities "already possess": "A city may: (a) construct, maintain, and operate . . . electric 
light works . . . . (b) authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the works or 
systems listed in Subsection (l)(a) by others; . . . .(d) sell and deliver the surplus product or 
service capacity of any works or system listed in Subsection (l)(a), not required by the city or 
the city's inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city . . . ." If, from the plain language of 
U.C.A. § 10-8-14, it seems evident that municipalities may sell and deliver surplus product or 
service capacity of its electric light works not required by their inhabitants to those beyond their 
limits, then the other side of the coin logically follows: municipalities may not sell and deliver 
product or service that is not surplus to those outside their boundaries. This conclusion is 
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supported by two relevant opinions, that—while not exactly on point, are instructive. See e.g. 
CPNat'l 638 P.2d 519; County Water, 278 P.2d 285. 
The first is CP National. In CP National, eighteen municipalities, under the 
Interlocal Act, formed the Southwest Power Agency (SPA) in order to finance and purchase 
electric light and power works for their municipalities. SPA commenced negotiations with CP 
National for purchase of the entire system. CP National soon informed SPA that it had decided 
to sell its system to Utah Power and Light. SPA then informed CP National that unless it 
negotiated a purchase with it, it would commence condemnation proceedings. SPA later 
commenced condemnation proceedings. In the proceedings, SPA stated that it intended to 
purchase CP National and continue service using CP nationals's to-be-condemned electrical 
system, not only to customers living within the municipalities' boundaries, but to other 
customers living outside the municipalities. While the question answered in CP 
National—whether municipalities had the power to condemn and continue service of entire 
public utility systems, is not the question in this matter, the Supreme Court's statement about a 
municipalities' powers is applicable here. The Supreme Court cited Section 10-8-14 noting that 
it authorized cities to maintain and operate electric light works and authorized them to sell 
surplus to those outside of their boundaries. The Supreme Court, in explaining the section, also 
went on to explain how it limits municipalities as well: 
We believe that this language imposes a limitation on a city operating outside its 
borders. It negates the proposition that a city could purposely engage in the 
distribution of power to localities or persons outside its limits except to dispose of 
surplus . . . Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize a city to so 
operate its electric light and power works. 
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CP National, 638 P.2d at 524 (emphasis added). 
The second case is the County Water matter. See 278 P.2d 285. County Water 
deals with water works—not with electric service, but is analogous. In County Water, the County 
Water System, a public water works utility, was providing water in the same area as Salt lake 
City. County Water asked the Supreme Court to decide whether Salty Lake City's sale of 
surplus water beyond its city limits was subject to Commission regulation. The Court found the 
sale of surplus water was not. In reaching its conclusion, the Court addressed the fears of 
County Water, i.e. that Salt Lake City's selling and delivering of services outside its boundaries 
and on a broad scale, would compete with and possibly destroy the privately owned utility's own 
provision of service. The Court declared County Water's fears unfounded because "[s]uch 
activities are neither contemplated nor authorized by law; [the cities] have no authority to sell 
water outside the city limits except as expressly permitted by statute, U.C.A. §10-8-14, which is 
to sell the "surplus product. . .not required by the city or its inhabitants." The Court's 
statements help identify the limits of a municipalities' powers in providing public services and 
are analogous. Just as U.C.A. §10-8-14 does not authorize a city to sell non-surplus water 
outside its city limits, neither does it authorize a city to sell non-surplus electricity. 
The powers of the interlocal simply mirror those of the individual municipalities 
and are no greater. U.C.A. 11-13-213 states "Any two or more public agencies may make 
agreements between or among themselves: (1) for the joint ownership of any one or more 
facilities or improvements which they have authority by law to own individually', (2) for the joint 
operation of any one or more facilities or improvements which they have authority by law to 
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operate individually, . . ." In accordance with the powers enumerated in section 10-8-14, an 
Interlocal Entity, like HL&P, may be formed "to accomplish the purposes of [the public 
agencies'] joint and cooperative action with respect to facilities, services, and improvements 
necessary or desirable with respect to the acquisition, generation, transmission, management, and 
distribution of electric energy for the use and benefit of the public agencies that enter into the 
agreement"' U.C.A. § 11-13-203. Taking the principles garnered from CP National and County 
Water, if the municipalities may "construct, maintain, and operate . . . electric light works" and 
"sell and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of [those] works or system . . . not 
required by the city or the city's inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city", then so may 
the interlocal organized by those municipalities. U.CA. § 10-8-14. But it also stands to reason 
that if municipalities may not sell and deliver product or service that is not surplus to those 
outside their boundaries, then neither may interlocals organized by those municipalities. 
HL&P's argument is that because there is no statute explicitly giving the 
Commission jurisdiction over an energy services interlocal entity like itself, then the appropriate 
forum for resolving RMP's dispute is the district court, not the Commission. HL&P's isolated 
reading of the statutes, however, is inappropriate. 
Whatever conduct those statutes or cases may authorize for HL&P (and which 
would not fall within the Commission's jurisdiction), they still do not preclude the 
Commission's jurisdiction over an entity like HL&P when its operations or activities exceed 
those delineated by statute. 
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The Legislative Intent 
The reason for the mandate to read "the plain language of a statute as a whole, 
and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related 
chapters" is to interpret the intent of the legislature. 
cThe fundamental consideration which transcends all others in regard to the 
interpretation and application of a statute is: What was the intent of the 
legislature? All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it and are 
helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining that objective. In determining that 
intent the statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it was designed 
to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if that can be done consistent 
with its language." 
CP National, 638 P.2d at 522 (quoting Johnson v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831 (Utah 
1966)). HL&P's assertion, taken to its logical end, would impliedly leave one with the 
conclusion that an entity like HL&P could categorize anything to do with its sale and delivery of 
non-surplus product or service capacity as exempt from Commission jurisdiction. Because the 
legislature explicitly failed to speak on the subject, then any interlocal or municipality could 
bypass the regulatory mechanism by forming an energy service interlocal entity, then use that 
interlocal to compete with or substitute itself for a public utility's service in areas outside the 
municipalities' boundaries. The question is whether the legislature intended for this apparent 
"gap" to allow an interlocal to compete in such a manner. When viewing all the statutes 
governing interlocals and related statutes, those governing Commission jurisdiction, and case 
law interpreting these statutes, the answer is no. 
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It seems the legislature intended that when an interlocal like HL&P is acting 
within the limits of its powers, it is not subject to Commission jurisdiction. When it is acting just 
like a public utility in selling, delivering non-surplus services to customers outside member city 
boundaries, it is, for all intents and purposes, acting like a public utility insofar as its service to 
extra-territorial customers. To the extent it serves those extra-territorial customers, and to the 
extent it is acting just like any other public utility, it seems the legislature intended it would be 
considered a corporation, association, etc. and would be subject to commission jurisdiction as 
would any other public utility. This seems to be the legislative intent. The legislature did not 
intend to leave a gap for governmental agencies, like interlocals, to form what are essentially 
unregulated public utilities in an effort to target and serve non-resident customers in an effort to 
compete with certificated utilities. To conclude otherwise would undermine the purpose of the 
regulatory scheme the legislature implemented. 
The Supreme Court has already concluded the same. 
There is good justification for this limitation since municipally owned utilities are 
not subject to the jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service Commission, 
but are controlled solely b> the administration of the city or town wherein they 
are located. Customers who are non-residents of the municipalities would be left 
at the mercy of officials over whom they have no control at the ballot box, and 
they could not turn to the Public Service Commission for relief. 
CP National, 638 P.2d at 524. 
For these reasons, HL&P's Motion is denied. 
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Any person aggrieved by this Order may petition the Commission for review 
pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, U.C.A. §§ 63-46b-l et seq. Failure to do so 
will bar judicial review of the grounds not identified for review. U.C.A. § 54-7-15. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 3rd day of November, 2008. 
I si Ruben H. Arredondo 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 3rd day of November, 2008, as the Report and 
Order of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
/s/ Ted Boyer, Chairman 
I si Ric Campbell Commissioner 
I si Ron Allen, Commissioner 
Attest: 




Transcription of House Floor Debate 
on SB 43 After Transmitted From the 
Senate Floor - January 28, 1989 
fRecord #1, Side 2, Line 33 
[Summary of debate.] 
Moody Because of a glitch in the Code not discovered, 
consequently needed to be in here. Issue of co-
generation of electricity came up because of co-
generation at Utah State University. The electricity 
that they were generating there and its sale to UP&L. 
The part of the bill addressed is on page 6, line 5. The 
language in 18 on line 5 was out the Code. Then when 
there were some change made in 1985 it so happened that 
this particular paragraph was put in inadvertently. This 
bill's purpose is to take out the language. 
Reason why it is important is because with the language 
in it would make certain that cities within a state. . . 
cities with own generators or cities that were with 
entities or buying the electricity or co-ops within the 
electrical system of distribution . . . 
Consequently with this paragraph back in cities and other 
entities would be under the PSC and this was not 
intended. | 
Because of the fact that these are co-ops and 
consequently profits that are made out of systems then 
goes back to the communities and consequently they are 
not addressed by the PSC and not responsible for that and 
the bill takes out language so it is as it was before. 
Ostler On page 6, lines 5-7 took out and on page 16, line 16-18 
identical language without government entities. Why? 
They both refer to same section why not just cross out 
government entities? Why definition had to be put in 
different place? 
Moody New language only applicable to section at the end. 
Ostler Just two words left out. 
[There is irrelevant discussion not transcribed.] 
Moody Maybe we ought to circle this and come back to it. 
[Committee of the whole is motioned for five minutes. Reed Searle 
is called to explain.] 
Searle Purpose was to correct error made in the legislature in 
1985. 
Specifically, 1985 the purpose of legislature was to make 
sure government entities particularly including the 
universities could become electrical co-generators under 
the Federal PURPA Act. Generating electricity without 
waste heat without becoming regulatory by the PSC. The 
definition of person (by you in 1985) included government 
entities for the specific purpose just mentioned. 
[Verbatim transcription.] 
Determine later that it could be read and be interpreted 
that government entity (i.e. IPA) could be deemed fully 
regulated by the PSC and this was not intended by the 
sponsor, not intended by the legislature, and not 
intended by this body. 
This bill is to correct this problem at the same time 
without disrupting the original purpose of the 1985 Act 
of allowing some government entities to become power co-
generated without becoming subject to the PSC. So the 
legal staff . . . protect the intent of the legislature 
moved the definition from the section that applies to the 
entire title of the Code so that now the special 
definition of person for co-generation purposes applies 
only to the specific chapter that applies to co-
generators because government entities throughout the 
Code just like businesses, corporations, citizens or 
cities should for most of the Code be considered as 
persons. The specific definition of person now applies -
- the attempt is to make it apply only the co-generation 
chapter of the statutes and allow the general definition 
of person to remain for the remainder of that particular 
title as well as the balance of the Utah Code. 
Ostler Why was it moved to a new section. 
Searl_e Had to move it so that it would not apply to the entire 
title. 
Moody [Sums up.] The bill in 1985 was amended to provision co-
generation. . . the wording in 1985 was in error . . . 
resulted in the appearance that the PSC may have been 
granted general jurisdiction over all electrical utility 
systems owned by municipalities or other government 
entities. This bill signifies that such general 
jurisdiction was not granted and it was not intended that 
it be granted. 
